The Real War by Richard Nixon

Author:Richard Nixon
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Simon & Schuster

NATO and Other Theater Forces

Because Europe and Japan are geographically close to the Soviet Union and vulnerable to attack by conventional forces with or without theater nuclear weapons, they have had to rely for their security on the U.S. “nuclear umbrella.” But now the Europeans and the Japanese see the spokes of that umbrella breaking, and they are questioning whether, if rain came, it would open.

Our major military problem after World War II was to defend Japan, which we had disarmed, and Western Europe, which was vulnerable to massively superior Soviet conventional forces. In Europe we established NATO, which blocked the Soviet advance to the west. In Northeast Asia we sent conventional forces to Korea to stop the communist advance, and then we kept them there to protect South Korea and Japan as well. Our nuclear umbrella sheltered both NATO and Japan and compensated for our inferiority in conventional forces. The presence of our ground troops in Western Europe and Northeast Asia made clear the seriousness of our commitment to the defense of Europe and Japan, and acted as a tripwire for nuclear escalation that effectively discouraged aggressive Soviet actions.

United States interests have not altered significantly since the close of World War II, but our ability to protect those interests has. Though geographically separated, Japan and Western Europe are two parts of one entity: that section of the industrialized democratic world that is threatened by Soviet military force. Both prospered under the protection America’s former nuclear superiority provided. Both are now increasingly vulnerable to military attack and to a crippling interdiction of supplies. Both are essential elements of the Western alliance.

The Europeans will not be satisfied with general “indications” of American support, nor with “signals” of American strength, nor vague “assurances” from the State Department proclaiming strong transatlantic bonds. They will insist on a clear and steady show of American interest in maintaining the security and stability of Western Europe. We cannot afford to be fuzzy, for as Raymond Aron has commented, Europe can put up with an absurd and even an unjust situation, but it cannot put up with an ambiguous one. History has shown that the nations of Europe tend to gravitate toward a stable status quo, even if that stable situation is otherwise less favorable. They prefer it to the risks of instability. Thus they will demand a matching American move for every Soviet threat, or they will be tempted to seek accommodation with the Soviets.

As West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt said in 1979, “Equilibrium is the main element underlying security. For many years now I have regarded balance of power as the indispensable precondition for peace and I now find that my conviction has been borne out.” If America does not ensure that equilibrium, if a failure of our will leads to an alteration in the balance favorable to the Soviets, then the European nations, as well as Japan, China, and countries like Saudi Arabia, will have every reason to fear and accommodate the Soviets. Such a trend would be our fault, and ours alone.

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